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RECENT CASES
ently enjoyed liberty.9 4 The decision may also have an impact on prison
disciplinary hearings where a violation of major proportions is alleged
and where the prisoner is deprived of the "liberty" of mingling with the
general prison population and is confined in an isolated cell block (prison
within a prison) for a substantial period of time. Here again it would
seem that notions of due process are equally applicable, especially since
such hearings may result in actually increasing the effective length of the
prisoner's sentence through loss of "good time" which he would otherwise
earn.
Inspite of the seemingly insurmountable burdens and procedural diffi-
culties imposed on the parole system by the instant decision, it is difficult
to dispute the inherent logic of the court's argument and the justice of its
position. Nothing rankles in the human breast more than a sense of in-
justice. Procedural fairness has for too long a time been sacrified on the
altar of expedience. By acting to reverse the order of priorities in some
measure the court has perhaps taken a step that not only will guarantee
a greater measure of justice in the correctional process but may also have
the welcome side effect of creating an atmosphere conducive to real re-
habilitation.
CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM
EVIDENCE-COCONSPIRATOR RULE ALLOWING ADMISSION OF ACCOM-
PLICE'S DECLARATION HELD NOT VIoLATIVE OF SixTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
OF CONFRONTATION
Discovery of the handcuffed, bullet-riddled bodies of three police offi-
cers led to the arrest of appellee Evans, and two suspected accomplices,
Williams and Truett. Charged with murder, Evans pleaded not guilty and
asked to be tried separately. Truett was granted immunity from prosecu-
tion in return for his testimony as a State's witness. The case came before
the Supreme Court on appeal after the United States' Court of Appeals for
-the Fifth Circuit reversed the denial of a writ of habeus corpus by the
United States District Court of Georgia.' Truett, the prosecution's chief
witness testified that he, appellee and Williams were accosted by the police-
men while changing the license plates on a stolen car. As one of the officers
was searching the automobile, Evans grabbed his firearm, disarmed the
stated that the retroactive application of the decision is mandated since it is a consti-
tutional decision. Inmates of the Attica Correctional Facility have been granted retro-
active application of the Menechino decision.
94. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the notion that counsel
should be permitted in parole release hearings. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403,
410 (2d Cir. 1970).
1. Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968).
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other two, and with Williams, compelled the officers into a wooded area
and shot them at close range. Georgia law requires corroboration of an
accomplice's testimony in a criminal trial.2 In addition to Truett, the
prosecution offered nineteen other witnesses, among them a man who
identified the burning automobile at the scene as his, and one Perry who
testified to a conversation with Evans about the car theft and subsequent
events. The assignment of error, however, was to the testimony of one
Shaw, admitted over defense counsers objection, to the effect that while
an inmate in the federal penitentiary at Atlanta, Williams was brought
there for arraignment, after which he told Shaw: "If it hadn't been for
that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now." a The
objection was that this statement constituted hearsay, admission of which
violated appellee's constitutional right to confront opposing witnesses. 4
Georgia's coconspiracy rule provides that declarations made by a con-
spirator are admissible against coconspirators if made in the course of
or in furtherance of the conspiracy, or during its concealment phase. Held,
Georgia's coconspirator rule which permits admittance of declarations by
one accomplice against another during the concealment phase of the con-
spiracy, while concededly broader than the federal rule, is not violative of
a defendant's sixth amendment right to confront opposing witnesses. Dutton
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).6
The sixth amendment right to confront witnesses has been the subject
of considerable Supreme Court adjudication in recent years. In Pointer v.
Texas,7 defendant was charged with the armed robbery of one Phillips,
who identified him at a preliminary hearing. Phillips moved outside the
jurisdiction, and the state therefore entered into evidence his previous tes-
timony over defendant's objection. Defendant had neither been repre-
sented by counsel nor had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness
at the preliminary hearing. He objected to admission of this evidence as
2. GA. CoDE ANN. § 38-121 et seq. (1954).
3. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 77 (1970).
4. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the Witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense (emphasis added).
5. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954) provides:
After the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the declarations by any one, of the
conspirators during the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible
against all.
6. Hereinafter referred to as instant case.
7. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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violating his sixth amendment right of confrontation. The Supreme Court
held the sixth amendment right of confrontation to be a fundamental
right, made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth.8 The Court, in
reaching its conclusion, emphasized the value of cross-examination to a
defendant, stating:
Because the transcript of Phillips' statement offered against peti-
tioner at his trial had not been taken at a time and under circum-
stances affording petitioner through counsel an adequate oppor-
tunity to cross-examine Phillips, its introduction in a federal court
in a criminal case against Pointer would have amounted to denial
of the privilege of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
ment.O
Douglas v. Alabama,0 decided the same day as Pointer, concerned convic-
tion of petitioner for assult with intent to murder. Loyd, an accomplice,
had been previously tried and convicted, and was called as a witness at
petitioner's trial. Since his appeal was pending, Loyd refused to answer
on fifth amendment self-incrimination grounds." The prosecution moved
to declare Loyd a hostile witness, which motion was granted, allowing the
prosecution to cross-examine him. The prosecutor read an alleged confes-
sion of Loyd's which incriminated petitioner. Three police officers testi-
fied to its authenticity, although the document was never offered into
evidence. Loyd made no response to the purported confession during its
presentation. Petitioner's objection on confrontation grounds was upheld
by the Court's finding that his inability to cross-examine Loyd, which de-
pended on Loyd's affirmation of the declaration as his,' 2 plainly denied
his rights as secured by the confrontation clause.13 The Court emphasized
that the prosecution's reading of the declaration "may well have been the
equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony that Loyd in fact made the state-
ment. . . ."14 Barber v. Paige5 held a witness is not unavailable to allow
8. Id. at 403.
9. Id. at 407.
10. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
11. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V provides that in all criminal trials, the accused shall not
"be compelled . . . to be a witness against himself.
12. 380 U.S. at 420.
13. Id. at 419.
14. Id.
15. 390 U.S. 719 (1968). This case followed Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967), which held compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in a defendant's favor
to be required by the sixth amendment and obligatory on the states by the fourteenth.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether a conviction should be set aside after admission of a codefendant's confession
implicating petitioner although the jury had been instructed to disregard the confes-
sion as to the petitioner. The Court found that despite the charge by the trial judge,
there was a substantial risk that the jury looked to the alleged confession in arriving
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prior statements of his as evidence unless the state has made a good faith
effort to obtain his presence. Last term, the Court held that when a de-
fendant is acting as his own counsel, and where his actions are such as to
disrupt the trial proceedings to such a point as to make it impossible to
continue with the proceedings in his presence, his removal from the -trial
court does not violate his right to confront witnesses as his actions are
deemed a waiver of the right to be present at proceedings against him.10
In California v. Green,17 the Court was concerned with a situation where
a witness ,had made damning statements against petitioner at a preliminary
hearing, but at the subsequent trial, due to a loss of memory, was unable to
remember the events to which he had previously testified. Here, the witness
had been arrested for sale of marihuana, and had identified the petitioner
as his supplier. The prosecution was allowed to enter his previous testi-
mony over petitioner's objection. As to the argument that the petitioner
had not cross-examined the witness at the hearing, the Court stated that
the present availabilty of the witness for cross-examination was sufficient.18
In all but one of the above cases, the Court was presented with a situa-
tion where testimony of one defendant was offered, in one form or an-
other, at the trial of the petitioner. This leads one to a discussion of the
declarations and acts of defendants as they apply to and are admissible
against codefendants in criminal proceedings. Necessarily, the Georgia
coconspiracy rule as it conflicts with the federal rule must be considered.
The Georgia rule involved in the instant case is supported by a num-
ber of other state decisions. In Carter v. State,0 petitioner was tried sepa-
rately and convicted after he and a codefendant were charged with arson.
Statements by the codefendant which implicated petitioner and which had
been made after the commission of the arson were admitted on the grounds
that acts or conduct of an accomplice not only during the pendency of the
unlawful act, but in its concealment as well, are admissible against other
accomplices. The theory behind the holding was that the conspiracy was
still active during the attempts at concealment. This ruling was followed
in Chatterton v. State20 where it was stated: ". . .so long as the conspiracy
at a guilty verdict as to the petitioner, admission of which violated petitioner's right of
confrontation. The decision recognized the impact to a defendant's case inherent in
an accomplice's incriminations, even to the extent of not being rendered ineffcctual
by a jury charge to ignore them. The holding was made retroactive in Roberts v.
Russell, 393 U.S. 899 (1968).
16. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). This decision represents a digression
from the rigid protectionism afforded by the Supreme Court to the confrontation
clause in its prior decisions.
17. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
18. 399 U.S. at 165.
19. 106 Ga. 372, 32 S.E. 345 (1889).
20. 221 Ga. 424, 144 S.E.2d 726, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1015 (1965).
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to conceal the fact -that a crime has been committed or the identity of the
perpetrators of the offense continues the parties to such conspiracy are
to be considered so much a unit that the declarations of either are admis-
sible against the other."21 Likewise, in State v. Roberts22 where the de-
fendant was convicted of murder on a declaration made by a codefendant,
after perpetration of the murder and while the defendant was not
present, defendant's objections that such evidence was erroneously ad-
mitted and prejudicial were overruled. In State v. Emory,23 it was said
that "[o]nce the conspiracy is so far established as to make the ascertain-
ment of the fact a jury question ... evidence of the declarations and acts
of the coconspirators are admissible so far as they pertain to the further-
ance of the common criminal design, to its consummation, to the disposi-
tion of its fruits, and to acts done to preserve its concealment.".2 4 The
principle has been accepted by the courts of Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Massachusetts, Mississippi and Oregon.25
The federal coconspiracy rule limits admissions of conspirators against
fellow conspirators to those made in the furtherance of or in the course
of the conspiracy, but not to the concealment phase. In Brown v. United
States,2 6 overturning a murder conviction on the grounds of improper
admittance of statements by an accomplice after the murder, the Court enun-
dated the principle that "[a]fter the conspiracy has come to an end, whether
by success or by failure, the admissions of one conspirator by way of narrative
of past facts, are not admissible against the others. '27 The question as to
when a conspiracy was to be considered consummate was answered when
it was held that admissions made subsequent to the overt act when the
purposes of the conspiracy had been accomplished were inadmissible.28 In
21. 106 Ga. at 432, 144 S.E.2d at 732. See also Burns v. State, 191 Ga. 60, 11
S.E.2d 350 (1940).
22. 95 Kan. 280, 147 P. 828 (1915).
23. 116 Kan. 381, 226 P. 754 (1924).
24. 116 Kan. at 384, 226 P. at 756. Accord, State v. Shaw, 195 Kan. 677, 408 P.2d
650 (1968); State v. Turner, 193 Kan. 189, 392 P.2d 863 (1964); State v. Borserine, 184
Kan. 405, 337 P.2d 697 (1959); State v. Bundy, 147 Kan. 4, 75 P.2d 235 (1938).
25. See Dailey v. State, 233 Ala. 384, 171 So. 729 (1937); Hooper v. State, 187 Ark.
88, 58 S.W.2d 434 (1933) ; Reed v. People, 156 Colo. 450, 402 P.2d 68 (1965) ; Smaldon
v. People, 103 Colo. 498, 88 P.2d 103 (1939); Hoffman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 30 P.2d
575 (1931); Commonvealth v. Smith, 151 Mass. 491, 24 N.E. 677 (1890); Watson v.
State, 166 Miss. 194, 146 So. 2d 122 (1933); State v. Robinson, 120 Ore. 508, 252 P. 951
(1927); State v. Gauthier, 113 Ore. 297, 231 P. 141 (1924).
26. 150 U.S. 93 (1893).
27. Id. at 98.
28. Hauger v. United States, 173 F. 54 (4th Cir. 1909). In Lew Moy v. United
States, 237 F. 50 (8th Cir. 1916), petitioner and a codefendant were convicted on the
testimony of a third accomplice of conspiracy to bring ineligible aliens into the country.
Petitioners contended that the overt act which should mark the termination of the
conspiracy was when the last alien was brought across the border. The Court held
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Fiswick v. United States,29 it was declared that "[tfhough the result of the
conspiracy may be continuing, the conspiracy does not thereby become
a continuing one."8 0 Indeed, the Court explicitly declared that confes-
sions or admissions after apprehension are not in furtherance of the enter-
prise since apprehension frustrates the criminal endeavor.8' The "harmless
error" doctrine was formulated by the Court in Kotteakos v. United
States.32 If admissions are erroneously admitted, but there is certainty that
they had little or no effect, the conviction will stand. If, however, "it
cannot [be said] with any fair assurance . . . that the judgement was not
substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that sub-
stantial rights were not affected."33 Under such circumstances, the con-
viction must be set aside. Moreover, the fact that there may be independent
evidence sufficient to support the verdict is irrelevant if the possibility
exists that the erroneous evidence had substantial influence.84
The most extensive and incisive discussion of the federal approach is
found in Krulewitch v. United States35 where petitioner was indicted for
conspiracy to persuade and induce a woman to cross state lines for pur-
poses of prostitution. Testimony as to damaging statements made by an
accomplice were found to have been made after termination of the con-
spiracy, and thus were held inadmissible. The government contended
that inherent in every conspiracy, either expressly or impliedly, is a "sub-
sidiary objective" to conceal the facts or identities of the parties.30 In
that this was too narrow a focus since more was required to bring about the unlawful
end than mere transportation across international boundaries. Thus, this decision
brought into consideration examination of the unlawful end sought to be attained to
determine which overt act would terminate the conspiracy. This rule was examined in
Graham v. United States, 15 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1926), where petitioner and four
accomplices were convicted of narcotics offenses after two addicts, who had been
arrested after they sold morphine to police officers, testified that the petitioners had
been their source of supply. The court held, relying on Brown v. United States, 150
U.S. 93 (1893), that the acts or declarations are admissible only if during the pendency
of the conspiracy, or in furtherance of its object. However, the court explicitly announced
the federal view as to the extent of an active conspiracy: "As a general rule the arrest
of a coconspirator may be said to effectively preclude any further concerted action,
and ordinarily puts an end to the conspiracy." Id. at 743.
29. 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
30. Id. at 216.
31. Id. at 217.
32. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
33. Id. at 764-65.
34. Id. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953), upheld the conviction of
petitioner and four codefendants on charges of obtaining entry into the United States
of aliens by fraudulent means, holding that admission of incriminating declarations
by one of the accomplices made after termination of the conspiracy were of such nature
as to be harmless, irreversible error under the guideline of Kotteakos.
35. 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
36. Id. at 443.
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rejecting this contention, the Court reiterated that a going conspiracy was
required.3 7 Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring,33 offered a scathing denuncia-
tion of the government's position.
We should disapprove the doctrine of implied or constructive
crime in its entirety and in every manifestation.... I should con-
cur in reversal even if less than sure that prejudice resulted, for
it is better that the crime go unwhipped of justice than that this
theory of implied continuance of conspiracy find lodgement in
our law, either by affirmance or tolerance.39
The decision established the view that prior to termination of a conspiracy
statements by an accomplice are considered authorized by codefendants,
but that such authorization cannot be assumed past the point at which
the purpose of the conspiracy has been either fulfilled or foiled.40
In the instant case, Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality
rejected petitioner's argument that the Georgia coconspirator rule should
be declared void because it was broader than the federal rule on the grounds
that the federal rule was merely the product of the Court's rule-making
power in the area of evidence. In addition, he was of the opinion that
the limitations of the federal rule were not required by the sixth amend-
ment.41 As to the statement of Shaw it was found to be of "peripheral
significance," the Court concluding that petitioner's right to confrontation
had not been denied.4 In reaching this conclusion the Court stated: that
since the statement contained no assertion of past fact, "it carried on its
face a warning to the jury against giving the statement undue weight;" 43
that Williams' knowledge of the identity of his fellow accomplices had
been established both by his prior conviction and Truett's testimony; that
the possibility of faulty recollection on Williams' part was unlikely; and
that the circumstances surrounding the admission were such as to make
misrepresentation of appellee's role improbable.44 In addition, Justice
Stewart was of the opinion that cross-examination of Williams himself
would not in any way have changed the outcome. 45
37. Id.
38. Id. at 445.
39. Id. at 457.
40. Id. at 442.
41. Instant case at 82.
42. Id. at 88.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 88-89.
45. "Evans exercised, and exercised effectively, his right to confrontation on the
factual question whether Shaw had actually heard Williams make the statement Shaw
related. And the possibility that cross-examination of Williams could conceivably have
shown the jury that the statement, though made, might have been unreliable was
wholly unreal. Id. at 89.
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Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger, wrote a separate
concurring opinion46 in which they accepted the plurality's judgement.
However, reciting facts surrounding the alleged declaration which cast
grave doubt on its credibility, and emphasizing the testimony of the other
witnesses, he was of the opinion that the admission of Shaw's testimony
constituted harmless error.4 7
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring,48 in a familiar vein, thought the proper
approach was to look at the issue in terms of fifth and fourteenth amend-
ment due process. The question then becomes whether or not there had
been "adequate 'confrontation' to satisfy the requirement of the [confronta-
tion] clause."'49 Of the opinion that exclusion of such testimony is to be
preferred, he nevertheless concluded that to do so is not essential to a fair
trial.
Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan,
dissented.50 He flatly rejected Justice Stewart's view that cross-examination
of Williams would not have changed the effect of Shaw's testimony, em-
phasizing the importance of cross-examination and the reliance placed on
it by defense counsel- generally. Pointing to the ambiguity of Shaw's state-
ment, he argued that "absent cross-examination of Williams himself, the
jury was left with only the unelucidated, apparently damning and patently
damaging accusation as told by Shaw."5' The result was to allow the ad-
mission of the prejudicial statement via an intermediary, which he "had
thought . . . was precisely what the Confrontation Clause as applied to
the States ... prevented."5 2 He considered the plurality's opinion to have
been reached "in the complete absence of authority of reasoning to explain
that result."5 3 Carried to its logical end, he concluded, the plurality's de-
cision would completely overturn precedent, and would allow any state
exception to the hearsay rule to become an exception to the confrontation
clause as well. He felt Shaw's statement did have significance, and could
well have contributed to the corroboration.
The plurality's decision appears to have missed the real issue, namely,
whether a federal and state rule so at variance with one another can both
adequately safeguard a defendant's constitutional rights. The finding that
these two rules are not necessarily exclusive is conclusory, and the support
upon which it rests is that the coconspirator rule, whether federal or state,
46. Id. at 90.
47. Id. at 93.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 97.
50. Id. at 100.
51. Id. at 104.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 105.
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is evidentiary in origin. Yet, the right to confront opposing witnesses is
affirmed as a fundamental right. The result is that a fundamental right is
impaired by a state evidentiary rule. On these grounds, the decision in the
instant case is untenable, for the degree of justice a man receives should
not be constrained by a state rule which facilitates conviction. The plu-
rality never adequately explained the basis of the decision, and failing
this, turned to the "harmless error" doctrine. Their dismissal of the evi-
dence on this ground appears to have been proved patently at variance
with the Kotteakos test54 in Justice Marshall's dissent. It is difficult not to
have doubts that the evidence may well have swayed the jury, especially
in light of the trial judge's charge.55 Regardless of the weight of the other
evidence, Douglas' recognition that an accomplice's statements are usually
highly prejudicial and potentially very damaging lends credence to the
suggestion that Shaw's testimony could well have influenced the jury in
reaching its verdict. In this case, the federal rule, both in terms of justice
and logic is the sounder, for it places a limit on the time when a defendant
can be bound and put in jeopardy by an accomplice's admissions. This
point has been declared to be when the conspiracy has ended, that is, when
the last overt act has been consummated. The conspiracy has been defini-
tively declared at an end by prior Supreme Court decisions when the con-
spirators are in custody. The rejection by the Court of imputed conspiracy
in Krulewitch and the warnings contained in that decision against expand-
ing the doctrine of conspiracy stand as sound judicial policy which casts
the decision in the instant case as anomolous. The decision neither answers
the essential questions, nor does it serve to clarify existing law in this area.
Rather, it has all the earmarks of a Pandora's box waiting to be opened.
NORMAN A. LEBLANC, JR.
FAMILY LAW-STATUTE PROVIDING FOR MATCHING RELIGIONS OF CHILD
AND ADoPTIvE PARENTS WHEN PRACTICABLE DEEMED INAPPLICABLE WHERE
IT WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY DELAY PLACING CHILD
In this civil proceeding against a mother for neglect of her out-of-
wedlock child, the Family Court of New York City was presented with
two issues; namely, whether the mother's consent was necessary for an adop-
54. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
55. The charge to the jury in pertinent part reads: "Slight evidence from an
extraneous source identifying the accused as a participator in the criminal act will be
sufficient corroboration of an accomplice to support a verdict". Evans v. State, 222 Ga.
392, 394, 150 S.E.2d 240, 244 (1966) (emphasis added).
